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Abstract
The provision of social services by private providers is widespread in OECD countries, but
the jury is still out on whether marketization has improved service quality. This paper seeks to
nuance existing debate by examining difference in service quality between different types of pri-
vate providers. We argue that different forms of private ownership are associated with varying
intensity of incentives for profit maximization, ultimately affecting the quality of service provi-
sion. Using residential elder care homes in Sweden as our universe of cases, we leverage novel
panel data capturing the ownership of the providers that operate nursing homes against a set of
indicators pertaining to the facility-level service quality. The results suggest that providers with
high-powered incentives to make profit, such as those owned by private equity firms and pub-
licly traded companies, consistently deliver lower-quality care, compared with ordinary private
companies and non-profit organizations.
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1 Introduction
The quality of complex social services — e.g. elder care, child care or education — is vital for indi-
viduals and societies. In almost all OECD countries such services are delivered by public as well as
private providers, operating in quasi-markets (Gingrich, 2011). Since social services performance is a
central social and political issue, it is a common concern for scholars and practitioners to understand
if there are systematic differences in the service quality delivered by different types of organizations
and, if so, why this is the case (Amirkhanyan et al., 2018; Broms et al., 2020). So far, most of the
literature in the field has dealt with the public-private dichotomy. This is understandable since up to
a few decades ago private for-profit organizations had almost no part in social service delivery, espe-
cially in the northern European welfare states (Armstrong & Armstrong, 2019; Blix & Jordahl, 2021;
Brennan et al., 2012; Busemeyer et al., 2020).1 Therefore, the marketization of social services was a
significant change in the history of the modern welfare state, requiring a systematic examination of
its effects. As a contribution to this quest, this paper seeks to nuance existing scholarship by studying
differences in service quality between different types of private providers.
The pros and cons of marketization have been much discussed in academic and policy circles for
many years (Blank, 2000; Brennan et al., 2012; Gilbert et al., 2002). Advocates of marketization
usually build on the classic argument that private ownership and competition drive prices down and
improve service quality (Shleifer, 1998). Critics point to various deficiencies associated with mar-
ket provision of social services, such as incomplete markets (quasi-markets) and contracts or low
measurably of quality of complex serves (Brown et al., 2016; Gingrich, 2011; Hart et al., 1997).
Consequently, most of the literature has focused on the public-private dichotomy, which may come
at the expense of overlooking important differences within a broad category of private providers. A
failure to recognize that the heterogeneity in performance could be driven by the organizational differ-
ences among private organizations may have contributed to the inconclusive results of the empirical
literature (Bergman et al., 2016; Broms et al., 2020; Forder & Allan, 2014).
This paper investigates the quality effects of the types of ownership of private providers of social ser-
vices. Building on Hart et al. (1997) that under contractual incompleteness profit-making incentives
1Social service delivery by non-profit organizations has a longer history, see Ansell & Lindvall (2021).
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of private service providers push them to sideline quality concerns in the pursuit of cost reduction,
we extend this argument by arguing that the strength of profit-maximizing incentives vary between
different types of private providers depending on the type of ownership. We theorize that the inten-
sity of profit-maximization incentives is particularly high in private equity ownership, as well as in
companies where ownership is organized via shares of stock, which are traded on a stock exchange
(publicly traded companies), but lower in companies owned by a relatively small number of share-
holders, who do not offer their company shares to the general public and are not backed up by private
equity investment (private limited companies). At the same time, due to the non-distribution con-
straint on residual earnings faced by nonprofits, the quality concerns are unlikely to be overridden
by the cost-cutting considerations, therefore, nonprofits shall outperform all private providers of so-
cial services on quality. We therefore expect systematic variation in the service quality provided by
private organizations, depending on the intensity of their incentives to make profit.
Using residential elder care2 in Sweden as our universe of cases, we leverage novel panel data cap-
turing the ownership forms of the providers that operate nursing homes, against a set of indicators
pertaining to the facility-level quality of service: staff density and education, as well as client sat-
isfaction. Our results reveals strikingly heterogeneous quality performance among private providers
of residential elder care. First, non-profit organizations consistently outperform all for-profit orga-
nizations. Second, looking closer at the for-profit category, we find that nursing homes owned by
private equity firms, as well as those owned by publicly traded companies consistently end up at
the lower end of the scale of our service quality indicators, compared to private limited companies.
These empirical observations are consistent with the idea that the intensity of profit-maximization
incentives affect the quality of social services. High-powered profit incentives seem to increase risks
for quality-shading.
2 Literature Review
The literature on the quality effects of different types of social services providers has so far focused
on the difference between public and private organizations, and no clear consensus emerged in the
2We use the terms residential elder care and nursing homes interchangeably.
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light of conflicting empirical evidence. Thus, some studies found private providers be associated
with higher service quality (Bergman et al., 2016; Blix & Jordahl, 2021; Castle et al., 2007; Holum,
2018; Stolt et al., 2011), but not others (Dahlström et al., 2018; Forder & Allan, 2014); and the
third group found mixed results (Broms et al., 2020; Winblad et al., 2017). However, there has also
been a growing interest in the performance of private providers: nonprofits and different types of
for-profit organizations. There are two separate strands of literature that inform this paper’s ambition
to examine the quality effects of the forms of ownership of service providers.
The first scholarly discussion of interest focuses on the variability of quality between different types
of for-profit providers. Within this literature, the increased presence of providers linked with private
equity investment has generated a scholarly and public debate about the role of private equity firms in
the provision of social services in such diverse settings as the U.S., UK, and Sweden (Duhigg, 2007;
Garside, 2017; Gupta et al., 2021; Palm, 2008; Plimmer, 2019; RadioSweden, 2011; Winblad et al.,
2017). The private equity business model, described in detail in Gompers et al. (2016) and Kaplan
& Stromberg (2009), is centered around leveraged buyouts of mature businesses3 with the goal of
selling them at a profit within a relatively short time frame. Private equity ownership is deemed to
be associated with exceptionally high-powered incentives to maximize company value, which may
be either beneficial or detrimental to service quality. On the one hand, private equity firms focus on
improving management practices of target firm and access to credit may boost quality. For example,
Bernstein & Sheen (2016) report a positive impact of private equity buyouts in the restaurant industry,
as restaurants become cleaner, safer and better maintained. However, the private equity firms focus
on cost cutting measures, their relative short-term horizons and weak relationships with target firm
stakeholders (Kaplan & Stromberg, 2009) could also adversely affect quality. Eaton et al. (2020)
argues that quality deterioration after private equity buyout is more likely in sectors with extensive
government subsidy and difficult to fully specify quality, such as the social services sector. Given
this theoretical ambiguity, there is a surprising paucity of empirical research on the quality effects of
private equity investments in the social services sector. Existing literature is small, limited in time
3Leveraged buyout is a type of investment where a target firm is acquired through debt financing (which is placed
on the purchased firm’s balance sheet), using funds of institutional investors. Unlike venture capital firms that invest in
emerging or young companies and do not obtain majority control in the purchased asset, private equity firms invest in
mature businesses and obtain majority control, thus making the purchased firm a private asset, free from restrictive public
company regulation.
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and scope and has yielded mixed results (Gupta et al., 2021; Harrington et al., 2012; Stevenson &
Grabowski, 2008; Winblad et al., 2017). Empirical research using high-resolution data from diverse
empirical settings and rigorous methods is much needed to adjudicate the arguments about the quality
effects of private equity ownership.
The second strand of literature discussing heterogeneity of private service providers is mainly inter-
ested in non-profit organizations. This literature presents a rather strong case for the quality advantage
of nonprofits, compared to for-profit organizations. The argument is predominantly rooted in Hans-
mann (1980)’s idea that since nonprofits may not lawfully distribute profits to those in control of the
organization (non-distribution constraint), they are less likely to behave opportunistically to sacrifice
quality to profit. Therefore, nonprofits are more likely than for-profits to deliver higher service qual-
ity where quality is particularly difficult to fully specify: in the domain of complex services, such
as education or elder care. Another potential source of quality advantage by nonprofits lies in the
alignment of the preferences of principals and agents derived from the mission-oriented nature of
nonprofits (Besley & Ghatak, 2005). Employees working in nonprofits are often driven by the or-
ganizational mission and values to a greater extent than those working for for-profit and even public
organizations, which has positive consequences for service quality.
Most of studies that have examined the impact of the provider nonprofit status on quality of care in
nursing homes support what might be called the quality advantage hypothesis (Amirkhanyan et al.,
2008; Ben-Ner et al., 2012; Chou, 2002; Grabowski et al., 2013; Harrington et al., 2001; O’Neill et al.,
2003), but see Amirkhanyan et al. (2018) for mixed evidence. This empirical consensus should, how-
ever, be treated with a pinch of salt as, similar to the literature on PE investments, the overwhelming
majority of these studies are based on cross-sectional data from the U.S., often focusing on regional
markets, which limits the generalizability of their findings.
We aim to contribute to these literatures by arguing that there is a common mechanism for explaining
the service quality by all private providers, ranging from private equity-owned to nonprofits. This
mechanism is the intensity of incentives to maximize profit: such incentives are particularly high
in private equity-owned and publicly traded companies compared to private limited companies, and
particularly low in nonprofits.
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3 Theory
The argument about the quality-improving effects of market provision of social services rests on the
idea that private owners are the residual claimants of any profit, which incentivizes them to “inno-
vate and become efficient” (Shleifer, 1998, p.135-137). In other words, profit-maximization — the
primary incentive of entrepreneurs — pushes private providers to improve quality and reduce costs.
However, a powerful counter argument was laid down by the cost-quality trade-off framework (Hart
et al., 1997). Having started from the observation that “the quality of service the government wants
often cannot be fully specified” in a contract, Hart and colleagues formally showed that contractual
incompleteness enables “significant opportunities for cost reduction that do not violate the contracts,
but... can substantially reduce quality”(Hart et al., 1997, p. 1128,1152). In other words, because ser-
vice quality cannot be unambiguously described in a contract and comprehensively evaluated upon
delivery, private providers are more likely to focus too much on the pursuit of cost reduction, sidelin-
ing the quality (Brown et al., 2016; Hart et al., 1997). Governments at all levels buy goods and
services “whose attributes and performance requirements are hard to define”(Brown et al., 2018, p.
739). Quality of social services, such as elder care, is challenging to specify for at least two reasons.
First, it has a large share of intangible aspects — for example, relational features — that are diffi-
cult to fully specify and monitor. Second, the sheer number of relevant aspects of high quality care,
makes it almost impossible to put everything into the contract, even when it is viable in principle.
Government procurement of elder care on the market therefore inevitably leaves the buyer with an
incomplete contract and the provider with ample opportunities for quality-shading.
The cost-quality trade-off framework (Hart et al., 1997) suggests that incentives to engage in cost
reduction at the expense of service quality is strong for all for-profit contractors. In contrast, we
argue that the strength of quality-shading incentives is not equal for all private providers, but depends
on the form of their ownership. While it is up for discussion how many forms of private owner-
ship are out there and how exactly to delimit them, four types of organizations usually operate on
the elder care markets: private equity (thereafter PE), publicly traded (thereafter PT), private lim-
ited firms4 (thereafter PL) and non-profit organizations (thereafter NP). Our basic assumption is that
4This form of ownership can take on different legal forms, such as sole proprietorships, ordinary partnerships, com-
panies.
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profit-maximization incentives have at least two dimensions: the preferred margin of profit and the
preferred time when profit occurs. Each of the ownership forms can be roughly categorized on these
dimensions. For example, if PE ownership is associated high margins of profit at a short time and
PTs with short-term profits, then PLs may prefer profit that is realized not immediately, but over
a long period of time. Based on this, we argue that PE and PT providers have a particularly high
intensity of profit-maximizing and, consequently, quality-shading incentives. On the other hand, PL
providers have a systematically lower intensity of quality-shading incentives than the previous two
types of ownership. Furthermore, because of the non-distribution constraint (Hansmann, 1980), NP
providers are situated at the very bottom of the hierarchy of intensity of quality-shading incentives,
last of all private entities. Below, we discuss this argument in more detail for each of the four types
of ownership.
PE firms typically acquire full control of a mature business with the single aim to increase the asset’s
market value and sell at profit (Barber & Goold, 2007; Jensen, 1989; Kaplan & Stromberg, 2009).
The “buy to sell” business philosophy of PEs, which is behind this form of ownership, defines their
underlying incentive — to maximally increase the asset’s value between the time of the buyout and
an exit. PE firms apply a range of financial, governance and operational engineering tools5, most of
which are aimed at cost control. Because PEs operate with borrowed moneys6 on a relatively short
terms — typically ten years (Kaplan & Stromberg, 2009, p. 123) — the seek to exit their investment
within this period. Thus, PE ownership is associated with aggressive profit-maximization in terms of
both the size and pace of profit realization, which in the context of the provision of complex social
services, is likely to give rise to quality-shading incentives (Eaton et al., 2020; Hart et al., 1997).
Publicly traded (PT) companies have a similar profit-maximization profile, but for different reasons.
PTs have typically a diverse ownership structure, with institutional investors often being the largest
shareholders. Shareholders evaluate the efficiency of their investments, based on the returns on
their investment, resulting in capital movements on the stock market to the most profitable com-
panies. While capital movements from less to more profitable companies is a normal feature of
5These tools include, but not limited to: aggressive use of debt, which provides financing and tax advantages; changes
to the compensation, benefits and composition of the management team of the acquired asset; organizational restructuring,
including lay-offs; adopting new technology, including information technology; re-branding; expanding to new markets
(Barber & Goold, 2007; Kaplan & Stromberg, 2009).
6PEs raise capital from large institutional investors, such as pension funds, sovereign wealth funds and endowments.
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well-functioning financial markets, a trend of increasingly shorter time-horizons of investors and
their demand for quicker return on investment have been observed over recent decades (Sampson &
Shi, 2020).7
This short-termism is associated with a change in the practice of financial reporting by PTs from
annual to quarterly that saw light in the 1990s. Statements about revenue and spending — quarterly
earning reports — have very large influence on share prices,8 thereby incentivizing PTs’ managers
to pursue strategies of short-term profit-maximization. Daniel Vasella, former chairman and CEO of
Novartis AG, described these short-term pressures and their implications for firm’s behavior (Vasella,
2002): “Once you get under the domination of making the quarter — even unwittingly — you start to
compromise in the gray areas of your business, that wide swath of terrain between the top and bottom
lines. Perhaps you’ll begin to sacrifice things (such as funding a promising research-and-development
project, incremental improvements to your products, customer service, employee training, expansion
into new markets, and yes, community outreach) that are important and that may be vital for your
company over the long term”. Thus, bowing to the pressures of quarterly capitalism (Barton, 2011),9
PTs are left with very little to invest in productive capabilities or quality-improvements.
When it comes to private limited firms (PL), the intensity of their incentives for profit maximization is,
arguably, the lowest among all for-profit companies. Since such companies are subject neither to “buy
to sell” PE business philosophy, nor to the pressures of quarterly capitalism, their profit-maximization
profile are likely to be different to those of PE and PT. Although profit is usually considered to be the
main motivation for business creation, many small business owners are motivated to start a business
on the basis of non-financial factors, such as personal or lifestyle considerations (Walker & Brown,
2004). As a typical PL business is a small business10, it is likely that for many PL owners profit-
maximization is not the main driver. Even if we assume that the PL owner desires as high profit
7Marc Andreessen, a prominent Silicon Valley venture capitalists, describes the situation as public companies being
pressured by their activist shareholders and investors “to give back huge amounts of cash instead of investing it in their
business.” (Primack, 2015). Between 2003 and 2012, PTs from the SP 500 index used more than 90% of their earnings
either to buyback their own shares from the open market or pay dividends (Lazonick, 2014, p. 46).
8For example, on July 23, 2015 Amazon released the second quarter’s earnings report that showed that the company
performed better than the Wall Street’s estimates. Within a matter of hours Amazon’s shares increased in value by a
staggering 18% (Pramuk, 2015).
9Dominic Barton used the term long before it was made popular by Hillary Clinton in her speech at NYU’s Stern
Business School on July 24, 2015.
10For example, as of September 1, 2021 47% of all private limited businesses in Sweden were single-owner firms
(Statistics Sweden, 2021).
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margins as PE or PT owners, her expectations in terms of the timing of profit realization are likely
to be different. A traditional owner runs the business as a longer-term operation and, therefore, may
prefer lower, but more stable profits, occurring over a long period of time.
Furthermore, PL companies are more likely to care about quality more than other for-profits because
their usually small size puts them in a greater financial jeopardy in case of a loss of an important
customer. For example, on a quasi-market of public service provision like Sweden, the financial
health of many PL providers depends on whether they manage to satisfy the quality requirements of
the purchasing public authority. Similarly, within, for example, a voucher system, where customers
respond to the deterioration in quality by “voting with their feet”, PLs bear a higher financial risk than
PEs or PTs. Taken these reasons together, we argue that the intensity of quality-shading incentives is
the lowest in PLs, compared to PEs and PTs.
Finally, nonprofits are the least aggressive profit-maximizers of all private owners. While both for-
profit and non-profit organizations may — and do in practice — lawfully earn profits, there is also
a fundamental difference between the two as to the freedom they have with regard to the utiliza-
tion of profit. While the former may, and routinely do, forward profits to the company’s own-
ers/shareholders, the latter is barred from distributing any profits it earns to people who exercise
control over the organization, but have to reinvest it into activities furthering the organization’s mis-
sion (Hansmann, 2000, p.228). As a result of such a nondistribution constraint on residual earnings,
nonprofits lack actors who have a share in both control of the organization and its residual earnings.
Consequently, as predicted by Hansmann (2000, 1980) and formally shown by Glaeser & Shleifer
(2001), founders/directors/trustees of nonprofits have weak incentives to maximize profits and to en-
gage in ex post expropriations of customers, such as to decrease the quality of the products/services
after the purchasing agreement is concluded.
Furthermore, unlike for-profits, nonprofits are entities that are neither formed nor organized in order
to generate profit, but are “dedicated to pursuing mission-oriented goals through the collective actions
of citizens” (Irvin, Renee, 2014). Such organizations are more likely to attract individuals who value
their organizational missions and therefore have an extra source of motivation — intrinsic motivation
— to work hard to achieve organizational goals (Park & Word, 2012). In the language of principal-
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agent theory, there is a greater alignment of the preferences between founders/directors of nonprofits
and their rank-and-file personnel than in for-profit organizations. In the parlance of organizational
studies, nonprofits may have higher mission valences, generating higher staff motivation (Rainey &
Steinbauer, 1999) and its greater cohesion (Boyd & Nowell, 2017; Kim, 2004). For these reasons, a
nonprofit that, for example, posits good quality care to elder people as its organizational goal, is more
likely to better attend to less tangible, relational features of care, than to cut down on care quality in
order to achieve other goals than a for-profit company.
Based on these considerations, our hypotheses are:
H1: Non-profit providers of elder care perform better on quality-related outcomes than for-profit
private providers.
H2: PL providers perform better on quality-related outcomes than PE/PT providers.
4 The Case: Residential Care Homes in Sweden
For most of the post-war period, Sweden has been the model case of a social democratic welfare state,
in which social services as well as education were almost exclusively funded and provided by the state
(Esping-Andersen, 1990; Gingrich, 2011). Although still mostly publicly financed, the provision of
social services and education became open to non-public organizations following a series of reforms
in the 1990s. As of today, quasi-markets have been established in central welfare sub-sectors like
primary and secondary education, health care, and elder care (Blix & Jordahl, 2021; Blomqvist,
2004). As Svallfors & Tyllström (2018) note, since breaking with the monopoly of public service
provision, marketization of social services and education in Sweden has gone faster, and reached
further, than in comparable countries (see also Sivesind 2017). Compared to neighboring Norway,
for example, elder care provided by for-profit organizations are about three times more common
in Sweden (Ågotnes et al., 2020). However, the majority of elder care is still provided by public
facilities, which is a sharp contrast to, for example, the United States where public nursing homes
care for less than ten percent of all residents in such facilities (Amirkhanyan, 2008). As in other
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Scandinavian countries, non-profit sector plays a small role in elder care in Sweden (Blomqvist &
Winblad, 2019, p. 513).
According to the Swedish Social Services Act (Socialtjänstlagen 2001:453), elder care is the respon-
sibility of Sweden’s 290 municipalities, and has been so since a comprehensive reform in 1992 (in
Swedish: Ädelreformen) (prop. 1990/91:14; SOU 2017:21) that significantly extended the social
responsibilities of municipalities. Today, elder care accounts for about half of municipalities’ so-
cial service budgets (Socialstyrelsen, 2020). The service is provided either in the recipient’s home
(hemtjänst) or in residential care homes (särskilt boende). The budget for residential care homes
make up about 60 percent of the total budget for municipal elder care. In this paper, we use residen-
tial elder care homes as our universe of cases.
Residential care homes provide service and care for elder people who live in the municipality and
need more care than can be provided through assistance in their own homes. Their needs are indi-
vidually assessed by a designated municipal officer (biståndshandläggare) and only those deemed in
need of residential care are granted access to the residential care service. In 2019, before the COVID-
19 crisis, residential care homes across the country housed 108,500 individuals at some time during
the year (Socialstyrelsen, 2020).
Once access is granted, costs for service and care are heavily subsidised from municipal budget. The
so-called “care fee” is means-tested, but the maximum fee remains at a very low level; in 2021 the
cap is 2,139 SEK per month (about 250 USD a month, corresponding to half of the national average
in rent cost for a studio apartment ), independent of municipality or ownership status of the nursing
home. Individuals admitted to care homes thus only pay a small fraction of the actual costs for their
care (Ågotnes et al., 2020). In addition to this fee residents pay a regulated rent and for their meals.
In line with the generally extensive level of autonomy enjoyed by Swedish municipalities, the Swedish
Local Government Act (Kommunallagen 1991:900) and the Swedish Social Services Act (Socialtjänstlagen
2001:453) allow municipalities to provide residential elder care in-house — i.e. staffing and manag-
ing care homes by themselves — or to buy it on the market. Swedish municipalities may contract
out residential elder care in two different ways: either through direct procurement, according to the
Public Procurement Act (Lagen om offentlig upphandling 2016:1145) or by way of a publicly funded
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choice system, according to the Free Choice Act (Lagen om valfrihet 2008:962). Under the former
regime, which is by far the most common, municipalities invite private companies to submit offers in
an open bidding process and then decide who gets the contract based on the specified criteria (usually
either price exclusively or price and quality combined). Under the choice system, the municipality
sets the price and specifies some quality requirements, and the municipal residents choose a provider,
according to their preferences, from an authorized list of providers that have met the municipality’s
criteria (Erlandsson et al., 2013). Even though the Free Choice Act has been in force since 2009, in
2019 only 22 out of 290 municipalities, most of which located around Stockholm, utilized it for the
provision of residential elder care.11
Nationally, the ratio of care home residents living in publicly-funded but privately-run facilities is
about one in five (Socialstyrelsen, 2020). Furthermore, private organizations delivering residential
care services are unevenly distributed across municipalities and regions (Jordahl & Öhrvall, 2013).
Private organizations operate in about a third of the municipalities and their share of the local market
varies from zero, often in sparsely populated and rural municipalities, to a majority, often in the
municipalities of the country’s metropolitan areas (Broms et al., 2020).
The group of private organizations that operate the Swedish residential care facilities is heteroge-
neous. First distinction can be made between for-profits and nonprofits.
a. NP (nonprofits) are the smallest group of providers, and their presence is geographically concen-
trated with 20% of residential care homes in Stockholm and 12% in Gothenburg being run by
nonprofits (SOU2017:21, 2017). Although many of these organizations operate one or a few facil-
ities, a number of larger nonprofits operate multiple facilities. Nonprofits most often take on such
legal forms as foundations or cooperatives with a strong mission, identity and values. For example,
Bräcke Diakoni is a foundation started in 1923 with the mission of achieving a more benevolent
society. Another example is Stora Sköndal, which is a relatively large nonprofit, whose aim is to
enable people to grow and develop, based on their unique conditions. It provides a range of social
services, including residential elder care in and around Stockholm.
11The choice system is more common for the home care (service is provided in the individual home where the client is
living). By 2019 it was adopted by 159 municipalities (SKR, 2019; Winblad et al., 2017).
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The for-profit category, dominating the market (Ågotnes et al., 2020; Erlandsson et al., 2013), con-
tains ample variation within, and can be classified into three groups:
b. PL (private limited) ownership ranges from sole proprietorships, partnerships or limited com-
panies, running one or a few facilities, to larger entities like Norwegian-owned Norlandia and
Danish-owned Förenade Care, two of relatively few foreign actors on the market.
b. PE (private equity) is a type of ownership that largely disappeared from the Swedish residential
elder care market in a wave of initial public offerings (IPOs) during the 2010s. Before that, it was
a substantial category, dominated by a handful of companies —Attendo, Humana, and Vardaga
(previously Carema Care) — that controlled a large share of the private residential elder care
market (Ågotnes et al., 2020).
b. PT (publicly traded) ownership consists of the former PE-owned entities went public, alongside
the noted Swedish investment company Investor, which for a long period was a majority share-
holder in one of the largest providers — Aleris.12
5 Data
To obtain a viable sample of Swedish residential elder care facilities and information about service
quality in these facilities, we rely on data from two interconnected surveys, carried out by the Swedish
National Board of Health and Welfare (Socialstyrelsen). Our primary source is the facility survey (En-
hetsundersökningen), which documents characteristics of individual facilities, such as size, profile,13
public/private ownership, as well as a number of quality-related attributes, particularly pertaining to
staffing matters. Aided by the municipal authorities, this survey is sent out to all residential care
homes in the country on an annual basis, except for the year 2013.14 As the facility survey was in-
terrupted by the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, the resulting dataset spans for seven years from 2012
12Aleris exited the market in 2019 by selling its facilities to Vardaga.
13For example, general care, short-term care or care for elderly with dementia.
14Due to this gap and because of the change in the timing of surveying (from the fall to the spring) in 2014, we treat
the 2012 wave as 2013.
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to 2019.15 The second data source is a survey that measures residents satisfaction with services at
their facilities Vad Tycker Äldre om Äldreomsorgen?, available from 2014 onwards. We employ an
item capturing the overall level of satisfaction. The resulting dataset consists of 14,613 observations
of 2,641 distinct facilities for seven years between 2012 and 2019 (mean coverage is 5.5 years).
To ensure comparability between surveys and years, we conducted extensive quality control16, and
created a numeric cross-year identifier for each facility.
5.1 Measuring Service Quality
Given the difficulties with which one may observe “true” quality in complex social services, we
employ several quality indicators as an effort to triangulate, informed by Donabedian’s input-process-
outcome framework (for more detail see Broms et al. 2020). We use five variables: four from the
facility survey and one from the residents survey. The first three, capturing input-related factors, are:
a) Staff density, b) Nurse density, and c) Staff education. The focus on staffing is rationalized by
existing consensus that there is “a proven association between higher total staffing levels (especially
licensed staff) and improved quality of care” (Bostick et al., 2006, p.366). For process-related quality
indicators, we employ d) share of residents with an updated action plan Updated plan, with data
from the facility survey. The final measure is a question from the user survey about residents general
e) Satisfaction with their care, capturing output-quality. Figure 1 depicts the distribution of these
variables.
15 Although Socialstyrelsen maintains that the annual surveys are largely comparable starting with the 2012 wave, a
number of facilities in 2014 offer only short-term care — something that is not observed in the surveys before or after.
To avoid unbalancing the sample, such facilities are excluded. Although in the 2012 data there are no facilities that are
reported to offer only short-term care, a number of the facilities that are identified as only-short-term for 2014 is present in
the 2012 data as well. Due to the likelihood that they actually offer only short-term, these observations are also excluded
for 2012.
16For example, we took great care to distinguish “unique” facilities from sub-divisions of a single operator and some-
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Figure 1: Distribution of Service Quality Indicators
Note: Distributions are from the full sample of privately-run facilities. Dashed line indicates mean
value.
5.2 Measuring Provider Ownership
To capture private providers’ ownership status, we matched any facility coded as private in the fa-
cility survey at any time point with information from several sources.17 First, using standardized
organization numbers,18 we identified non-profit facilities19. Second, the business registry contains
an indicator for PT companies, which we used to measure this category. Finally, to identify PE own-
ership we utilized the Capital IQ database, by replicating a search strategy by Strömberg (2008) and
enlisting the Capital IQ’s customer service help. The residual category of private provider make up
the final group of PL ownership.
Although the bulk of this classification was automatic, we manually cross-checked observations with
missing ownership information for a given year, as well as observations with deviating information on
ownership in the facility survey and the Business Register data.20 Table A1 of the Appendix reports
a full list of the privately-owned operators in the sample.
The overwhelming majority of care homes (N = 11,956 observations; n = 2,205 facilities) are run
17The matching was carried out using standardized workplace codes (CFAR), manually collected using the Retriever
business database and with the help of the Business Register.
18First digit(s) 7, 8, or 25.
19Either the organization directly running the facility or its registered parent company
20Along with a number of apparent miscategorizations in either source, such deviations mainly stem from the fact that
the facility survey is fielded in the spring time (except for 2012), while the annual records in the Business Register are
reported for the month of November.
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by the municipalities. This makes for a 82% share, lining up with the previously reported data from
Socialstyrelsen (2020). The rest is operated by privately-owned providers, including for-profit (N =
2,283; n = 470) and non-profit (N = 374; n = 77) organizations. Among the facilities run by for-profit
providers, PL-owned (N = 938; n = 227) slightly outnumber those owned by PE firms (N = 703; n =
237) and PT companies (N = 642; n = 230).
Figure 2 underscores, the previously noted (Broms et al., 2020; Jordahl & Öhrvall, 2013), visibly
uneven spatial distribution of private facilities across the country. While private facilities constitute
the majority (56%) of care homes in Stockholm county — the country’s most populous, they make
up around a third (Uppsala, Östergötland, Gotland) or a quarter (Skåne, Halland) of all care homes in
several other densely populated counties.
75 % - 100 %
50 % - 75 %
25 % - 50 %
10 % - 25 %
  0 % - 10 %
None
(a) NP (b) PL (c) PE (d) PT
Figure 2: Geographic distribution of facilities, by provider ownership
Note: Each hexagon represents one of Sweden’s 290 municipalities. Data from 2012-2019.
6 Model and Estimation Strategy
The structure and nature of our data present both opportunities and challenges for the task of properly
estimating the hypothesized links between ownership type and service quality. On the one hand, a
sample approaching the true population over a seven year period enables an empirically comprehen-
sive analysis, poised to generate generalizable claims for the realm of modern Swedish elder care.
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On the other hand, non-random spatial (potentially, also along other factors) distribution of the fa-
cilities means that there is a high likelihood of selection and omitted variable bias, which needs to
be addressed. The utility of the most commonly used approaches to remedy such biases, such as
facility-level fixed effects (FE), is limited here because the data contains only limited intra-facility
variation in the treatments. There are only 18 changes in the ownership status involving non-profit
and for-profit providers, presenting 3.4% of facilities that undergone ownership change, relevant for
H1. Variation is slightly larger in data for H2: there are 67 transitions from PE or PT to PL ownership,
constituting 14.3% of facilities that undergone ownership change. Therefore, although presenting the
facility-FE results below, the main analyses will account for potentially unobserved confounders by
including municipal- and year-fixed effects and a number of time-varying covariates at the facility
and municipality levels.
Our analysis departs from a pooled OLS model,
Service Qualityi,m,t = β0 + β1Provider Ownershipi,t + λi,t + θm,t−1 + ηm + γt + εi,t, (1)
which separately estimates the five measures of service quality in facilityi for year t, as a function
of two treatments: not-profit (H1) and PL ownership (H2). Municipal- and year-fixed effects are
denoted by (ηm) and (γt). Time-varying facility-level covariates (λi,t) are dummies for the facility’s
profile21 and the (log) number of beds. Time-varying municipal-level covariates (θm,t−1) are median
income, (log) population size, an interaction term between the two, and the share of residents older
than 65 and 80 years, measured at t-1,22 to account for socioeconomic and demographic pressures.
Standard errors (εi,t) are clustered by facility.
Table 1 reports the summary statistics for the variables used in the analyses testing the respective
hypotheses.
21Considering the potentially unreliable information regarding which facilities actually offer short-term care (see foot-
note 15), we assign all facilities that are recorded as offering short-term care for 2014 if said facility has as many or more
spaces in other years as in 2014. The logic behind this rule is that it is likely that the unit registered in the survey still
contains short-term operations. Conversely, if the unit has fewer spaces in other years, we assume that the short-term
operation really has been purged from the survey.
22Because with the exception of 2012, the facility survey information is collected in the first half of the year, but
municipal-level data comes from the end of year, municipal data from t-1 is more appropriate.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Sample H1: Nonprofits vs non-profits Sample H2: PL vs PE/PT
Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Operator category
Non-profit 2657 0.14 0.35 0.0 1.0
PL 2283 0.41 0.49 0.0 1.0
Outcomes
Ratio Staff:Residents 2453 28.13 7.18 3.1 119.8 2104 27.87 6.91 3.1 83.3
Ratio Nurses:Residents 2343 4.80 2.46 1.0 25.0 2019 4.66 2.38 1.0 25.0
Share of Staff w/ Appropriate Education 2486 82.54 14.52 7.5 100.0 2136 81.60 14.58 7.5 100.0
Updated action Plan 2534 96.92 8.81 0.0 100.0 2177 97.18 8.03 0.0 100.0
Resident Satisfaction 1947 81.61 12.33 29.0 100.0 1675 80.93 12.49 29.0 100.0
Facility-Level Controls
General care 2558 0.76 0.43 0.0 1.0 2196 0.76 0.43 0.0 1.0
Dementia care 2558 0.74 0.44 0.0 1.0 2196 0.75 0.43 0.0 1.0
Service flats 2558 0.05 0.21 0.0 1.0 2196 0.04 0.21 0.0 1.0
Short-term accommodation 2657 0.21 0.41 0.0 1.0 2283 0.22 0.42 0.0 1.0
Spaces 2556 47.37 26.16 2.0 208.0 2198 46.91 23.63 6.0 208.0
logspaces 2556 3.71 0.58 0.7 5.3 2198 3.72 0.53 1.8 5.3
Municipal-Level Controls
Population 2657 235831.96 316488.50 6694.0 962154.0 2283 201671.48 288584.81 6694.0 962154.0
log(Population) 2657 11.56 1.27 8.8 13.8 2283 11.43 1.22 8.8 13.8
Median income 2657 261.04 32.61 183.0 353.5 2283 259.40 32.18 183.0 353.5
Share population 80+ 2657 4.82 1.10 2.5 9.0 2283 4.86 1.12 2.5 9.0
Share population 65+ 2657 18.56 3.77 12.5 33.4 2283 18.80 3.82 12.5 33.4
7 Results
Figure 3 depicts bivariate relationships between provider ownership and service quality, including
public ownership to aid the interpretation of the results pertaining to private providers. Thus, if all
types of private providers outperform public ones, the implications would be different than if pub-
lic facilities consistently fare better than private ones. The former case presents marketization as
a positive development for service quality, while the latter — the opposite. Both outcomes would,
however, make our more nuanced argument about the difference between private providers less im-
portant. However, as figure 3 shows that there are noticeable and frequently statistically significant
differences between different private providers. First to note, facilities run by PE/PT companies are
near-consistently in the lowest end of the quality continuum. Second, nonprofits consistently score
the highest on quality among all private providers, and also higher than the public providers for all
measures but staff density. Public facilities are generally found between the private organizations
with the highest and the lowest incentives for profit-maximization. The one aspect of quality perfor-
mance bucking this pattern is the updated action plan indicator, on which PE and PT operators fare
17






















































































































Figure 3: Provider Ownership and Service Quality: Bivariate Relations
Note: Point estimates are from bivariate regressions. Capped lines indicate 95% confidence bands
from standard errors clustered by facility.
Bivariate analysis provides initial support to H1 and we proceed to its formal testing. Table 2 reports
the estimated differences for the five quality indicators between non-profit and for-profit (reference
category) facilities. Results for both the input and outcome indicators indicate a clear advantage
of nonprofits, which are statistically significant across the board. Contrastingly, the results for the
process-related indicator show significant advantage of for-profits. Further, the size of the coefficients
indicate that the quality differences associated with the non/for profit distinction are substantive. In
terms of relative variance, the difference between the two corresponds to nearly half of a standard
deviations for staff education, around three-tenths for staff density and resident satisfaction, and one-
fifth for nurse density and updated action plan.
18











(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Non-profit 2.17*** 0.55* 6.55*** -1.83* 3.60**
(0.64) (0.24) (1.19) (0.81) (1.26)
Municipal FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.21 0.36 0.24 0.13 0.21
N (Observations) 2453 2337 2486 2518 1870
n (Facilities) 513 512 518 518 443
Note: Reference category is for-profit ownership. †p<0.10 *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001. Stan-
dard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the facility level. All regressions include time-varying
municipals level covariates and year-fixed effects.
Next, we test H2 that facilities run by PLs have better service quality that those run by PE/PTs. This
analysis also garners salient contrasts. Table 3 reports that input quality in PL-operated facilities
is statistically significantly higher than in facilities run by PE/PT. The differences are substantively
meaningful with the magnitude hovering around one-fifth of a standard deviation on each dependent
variable. The coefficients for the process and outcome indicators are statistically not significant, but
are signed as in the H1 analysis: negatively for the process quality indicator and positively for the
overall satisfaction with care.











(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PL 1.46** 0.47** 2.65** -0.43 1.39
(0.45) (0.17) (0.99) (0.47) (0.92)
Municipal FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.22 0.34 0.25 0.11 0.21
N (Observations) 2104 2014 2136 2163 1607
n (Facilities) 455 454 460 460 390
Note: Reference category is PE/PT ownership. †p<0.10 *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001. Stan-
dard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the facility level. All regressions include time-varying
municipal level covariates and year-fixed effects.
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Recognizing the risk of the distortion effect of omitted variable bias on the estimates, we re-run
the analysis with the inclusion of facility-level fixed effects. Given the previously discussed limited
amount of within-facility variation in the treatment variables, our discussion focuses on the difference
in the ownership type within the for-profit group of providers (H2), while the results for H1 can be
found in the appendix (Table A2). The results reported in Table 4 suggest a significant quality-
advantage of PL providers for staff density and staff education. Notably, the effect sizes for these
staffing variables are larger than in the main results (Table 3), employing fixed effects at the municipal
level.23











(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
PL 2.40** 0.14 4.08* 1.32 1.24
(0.76) (0.20) (1.66) (0.83) (2.31)
N (Observations) 2104 2014 2136 2163 1607
n (Facilities) 455 454 460 460 390
Note: Reference category in PE/PT ownership. †p<0.10 *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001. Standard
errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the facility level. All regressions include time-varying facility
level covariates and year fixed effects.
To further check the veracity of the results, we conducted a number of robustness and sensitivity
checks, by employing different estimation techniques and altering the sample in substantively rele-
vant ways. We begin by expanding on the set of available modeling strategies and estimating tech-
niques. Specifically, in order to more explicitly deal with the non-random distribution of facilities
by ownership type (see figure 2), and the potential selection bias such non-randomness may incur,
we employ inverse probability weighing (IPWRA), with regression adjustment in order to make the
model double robust to mis-specification in either modeling treatment or outcome. While details of
this analysis are available in section D of the appendix, figure 4 reports its results, as average treat-
ment effects. These estimates are presented alongside the original coefficients from tables 2 and 3 for
reference, as well as corresponding estimates from the commonly employed random effects-estimator
23While it would be desirable to delve further into the within-facility dynamics by zooming in on any ownership
change, further disaggregation produces even smaller groups of observations and, consequently, unstable estimates. For
transparency the results of such analysis are reported in the appendix. They do not upend the results of the main analyses.
The closest approximation to a clear pattern is that the staff-relating outcomes improve with a transition from PE/PT
(N=41) and deteriorate with a transition in the other way (N=31), while the opposite is true for the Action plan variable.
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and the less-often used between effects-estimator, whereby only average between facility-level dif-
ferences is taken into account. As a whole, these alterations do not substantively change the findings
from the main analyses. However, the IPWRA results are slightly but consistently more bullish for
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Figure 4: Ownership and Service Quality: Results of Alternate Estimation Techniques
Note: Diamonds display point estimates with 95% confidence bands (robust standard errors, except
for the original results). Base = FE estimator; IPWRA = inverse probability weighting with regression
adjustment estimator; RE = random effect estimator; BE = between-effects estimator. Covariates are
the same as equation 1, without year-FEs in the BE-estimations.
Next, we redefine the sample from which our results are derived. First, we acknowledge some incon-
gruity between the pools of facilities contained in the Socialstyrelsen and Statistics Sweden datasets,
which we employ to define our sample. Whereas the latter follows a standardized industry code
scheme,24 including the category “Care in special forms of accommodation for the elderly” (87301),
the Socialstyrelsen’s dataset contains a small but non-trivial number of facilities (N=305 privately
owned), which provide other than 87301 type of services, or for which an SNI code cannot be de-
rived or plausibly inferred.25 As can be observed in figure 5, the alteration of the sample has not led
to any meaningful changes in the original estimates.
24SNI, a Swedish classification scheme corresponding to the EU’s standardized classification scheme (NACE) includ-
ing a further level of disaggregation (87301), distinguishing between residential elder care for elderly and care for disabled
people.
25One potential explanation for this divergence is that individuals who already reside in assisted living facilities that
dot not qualify as “the elderly” may be allowed to continue living in these facilities after reaching a certain age, and
are thereby included in the Socialstyrelsen’s sample. Another potential source of discrepancy lies with a special type of
accommodation — service flats — which falls under “home assistance” rather than residential care SNI code.
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Second, we recognize that the dominance of privately operated facilities within Stockholm county
and the large share of these observations in the nation at-large (40% of private facilities and 38 % of
for-profit facilities are located in Stockholm county) may give cause service quality different from
the rest of the country. The discussion above about the prevalence of the choice system here is an
example of how Stockholm county may be different to the rest of the country. Figure 5 attests that
the Stockholm/non-Stockholm division produces some substantively different estimates. However,
inter alia and compared to the original estimates, there is no a discernibly systematic pattern to these
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Figure 5: Ownership & Quality Indicators: Alternate samples
Note: Diamonds display point estimates with 95% (cluster-robust) confidence bands. Base = original
sample; 87301 = SNI code 87301 only; sthlm = Stockholm county; nosthlm = not Stockholm county.
In sum, despite a number of non-trivial challenges pertaining to the nature of the data, we arrived at a
credible estimation strategy that produced results supporting both of our hypotheses. First, Swedish
residential elder care facilities operated by nonprofits deliver higher quality of care than for-profits
(H1). Second, facilities run by companies of PL ownership deliver higher quality of care than facil-
ities operated by PE/PT companies (H2). A caveat to these findings concerns process quality, where
for-profits seem to outperform nonprofits, but the confidence level for this result is lower. A vari-
ety of the employed modeling and estimation choices, supplanted by a set of further robustness and
sensitivity checks, provides a strong empirical support to both of the hypotheses, at the same time
shielding our results from most apparent criticisms regarding omitted variable- and selection bias.
22
8 Conclusion
Private organizations are today important service providers in such areas as education and elder care,
even in countries where public organizations quite recently held a monopoly (Armstrong & Arm-
strong, 2019; Blix & Jordahl, 2021; Busemeyer et al., 2020). This important shift has spurred both
public and scholarly discussions about the organizational performance of public and private organi-
zations (Amirkhanyan et al., 2018). The literature holds both positive and negative theoretical expec-
tations regarding the consequences of marketization for quality of complex services in quasi-markets
(Brown et al., 2016; Hart et al., 1997; Schumpeter, 2013; Shleifer, 1998), and the empirical literature
shows mixed results when comparing service quality provided by public and private organizations
(Broms et al., 2020; Castle et al., 2007; Forder & Allan, 2014).
This paper sheds new light on the debate by looking closer at the heterogeneity within private or-
ganizations. In this category we find for-profit organizations, as well as non-profit organizations.
Moreover, the for-profit organizations have different types of ownership: some are owned by private
equity firms; some are traded publicly on the stock market, and some are held privately by a small
group of owners, as family companies.
We theorize that these different forms of ownership entail very different intensity of incentives to
make profit at the expense of service quality. Our theoretical framework stipulates that non-profit
organizations are likely to provide higher service quality than other private alternatives, because they
have strict constraints on how they can spend their profits and are able to attract more motivated
personnel (H1). We also suggest that when zooming in on for-profit organizations only, private eq-
uity firms and publicly traded companies have higher-powered profit-making incentives than private
limited companies, which leads PE/PTs to more extensive quality-shading than PLs. Therefore, we
hypothesize that PL providers outperform other for-profits on service quality (H2).
Having analysed the link between the form of ownership and service quality for providers of resi-
dential elder care in Sweden over time, we found that residential care homes run by nonprofits have
on average higher staff and nurse density well as better educated personnel, and more satisfied resi-
dents. For-profits have, however, more often an up-to-date action plan. Furthermore, we found that
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facilities run by PE/PT companies underperform on all of the input-related quality indicators (staff
density, nurse density, staff education), when they are compared to PL-run facilities. The same com-
parison reveals, however, no statistically significant differences on the process- and outcome-related
indicators (action plan and overall satisfaction, respectively). Taking the results in their totality, we
interpret them as being consistent with our hypotheses.
Our findings indicate that there are ways to run private organizations without compromising on qual-
ity, even when delivering complex services such as residential elder care, as long as the incentives to
make profit are not too strong. Our thinking why this is the case is rather straightforward: if the chase
for large profit margins at a quick pace creates too strong quality-shading incentives, then reducing
the profit-maximizing incentives of the provider should also decrease its incentives for cost-cutting.
As Hart et al. (1997) note, the problem with private providers of complex services is not that they lack
incentives for quality innovation, but that cost-reduction takes precedence over quality innovation.26
Private organizations capable of leveling incentives for cost-reduction and quality innovation could
thus produce service quality on par with, or even higher, than their public counterparts, also when it
comes to complex services. And indeed, while showing that PE/PT-run elder care homes exhibit a
high intensity of cost-cutting-quality-shading incentives, the opposite is true for PLs and nonprofits.
We also note that the service quality of public facilities is in between the care homes operated by
private companies with the highest and the lowest profit-maximization incentives.
The fact that PL ownership fares well in our analyses might be surprising to some. While this paper
has explored one mechanism — the intensity of profit-maximizing incentives — there are several
interesting additional mechanisms that can be investigated in future research. In line with principal-
agent theory, PLs owners may have more knowledge about the actual operation of their businesses
than the dispersed owners of the often large publicly traded companies. Another possibility is that
such companies have specific management styles. Amirkhanyan et al. (2018) show that certain types
of management — what they call “innovative management” — is associated with higher service
quality in U.S. nursing homes.
This paper makes important theoretical and empirical contributions to the literature. Theoretically,
26As a matter of fact, their model suggests that private providers have stronger incentives for quality innovation than
public providers.
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we expand the cost-quality trade-off framework by Hart et al. (1997), by arguing that the intensity
of such a trade-off is a function of the form of ownership. We make an empirical contribution by in-
troducing a new data on provider ownership over time from a mature welfare state and interrogating
it with advanced techniques of quantitative analysis. These empirical qualities of the paper make it
a benchmark for future research. The revealed pattern of differing quality performance by different
types of private providers may help to explain why the empirical literature on organizational perfor-
mance in the social services sector has thus far been inconclusive. Most importantly, by highlighting
the importance of heterogeneity of private providers of social services, specifically their forms of
ownership, our research improves the scientific understanding of and a broader public discourse on
the causes of quality of complex services. The existing division into public and private providers
is clearly insufficient, as it obscures important differences in organizational performance within the
private category, and may bias our comprehension of the role of private organizations in the provision
of complex social services.
25
References
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Category Most recent parent
x xx xxx xxxx xxxxx xxxxxx xxxxxxx xxxxxxxx Andreas Ands Minne,
Stiftelsen
7 NP
Betelhemmet i Jönåker 7 NP
Betlehemskyrkan Vasahemmet 7 NP
Bonell, Per 1 NP
Diakonistiftelsen Samariterhemmet 7 NP
Ersta Diakoni AB 19 NP Ideella Föreningen Ersta Diakonisällskap Med Fir
Ersta Diakonisällskap 18 NP Ideella Föreningen Ersta Diakonisällskap Med Fir
Floragården Ekonomisk Förening 7 NP
Föreningen Blomsterfonden 20 NP
Föreningen Edsätras Vänner 7 NP
Föreningen Fogdaröd Omsorg, Vård & Utbildning Utan Personligt
Ansvar
2 NP Föreningen Fogdaröd Omsorg, Vård & Utbildning Ut
Föreningen Judiska Hemmet 7 NP
Föreningen Tunabergs Gruppboende 7 NP
Gotlands Sjukhem 7 NP
Göteborgs Kyrkliga Stadsmission Bistånd Och Entreprenad AB 7 NP Stiftelsen Göteborgs Kyrkliga Stadsmission
Hyllie Park Äldreboende Aktiebolag 7 NP Hyllie Park Kyrkan
Immanuelskyrkans Vård Aktiebolag 7 NP Immanuelskyrkans Församling
Klöverlyckan Ekonomisk Förening 7 NP
Lennings Sjukhem/John O Matilda 4 NP
Neuberghska Ålderdomshemmet - Bambergers Vårdhem 6 NP
Norrorts Omvårdnad Ek. För. 7 NP
Omsorgskooperativet Brännagården Ek. För. 3 NP
Personalkooperativet Gullogården, Ek Förening 7 NP
Samfundet Birgittasystrarna 2 NP
Stiftelsen Borgerskaps Enkehus Och Gubbhus 7 NP
Stiftelsen Broängen 4 NP
Stiftelsen Bräcke Diakoni 35 NP
Stiftelsen Danviks Hospital 7 NP
Stiftelsen Göteborgs Sjukhem 7 NP
Stiftelsen Josephinahemmet 5 NP
Stiftelsen Lindåsa 6 NP
Stiftelsen Neuberghska Ålderdomshemmet 1 NP
Stiftelsen Otium 9 NP
Stiftelsen Röda Korshemmet 2 NP
Stiftelsen Skaraborgs Läns Sjukhem 7 NP
Stiftelsen Stockholms Sjukhem 6 NP
Stiftelsen Stora Sköndal 44 NP
Stiftelsen Torpahemmet-Anna Kjellbergs Minne 6 NP
Stiftelsen Ålderdomshemmet i Göteborg 6 NP
Suomikoti 6 NP
Sällskapet Vänner Till Pauvres Honteux 7 NP
Tillberga Grannskapsservice Ek Fö 5 NP
Åkerby Äldreboende Ekonomisk Förening 5 NP
Bräcke Diakoni Stockholm AB 30 PL→ NP Bräcke Diakoni AB
Bokebo Vård Aktiebolag 2 PE→ PL Norlandia Care Group As
Frösunda Omsorg AB 47 PE→ PL
A & O Ansvar Och Omsorg Aktiebolag 95 PL A & O i Sverige AB
A&O Temabo AB 59 PL A & O i Sverige AB
AB Vårdstyrkan i Stockholm 13 PL Vårdstyrkan i Stockholm AB
Adium Omsorg Aktiebolag 25 PL Ös Konsult AB
Aktiebolag Sjöstjärnan 7 PL Forenede A/S
Astagården Aktiebolag 1 PL Bikärr AB
Attendo Ektorpsgården AB 6 PL Prime Enterprise Sverige AB
Axeltorps Vårdhem AB 6 PL Jutas AB
Berzelii Vård Och Omsorg AB 5 PL
Bruka Äldrevård Aktiebolag 7 PL Bruka Äldrevård AB
Bäckbacka AB 2 PL
Bäckbacka Röbäck AB 4 PL Grethel Moberg AB
Enskilda Sjukhemmet Solliden Aktiebolag 6 PL Hospitality Invest As
Finskt Seniorboende AB 1 PL Finskt Seniorboende AB
Förenade Care AB 201 PL
Gammeluddshemmet Aktiebolag 3 PL Enestorp AB
Geriacare AB 4 PL Fyrvakten AB
God Omsorg i Kalmar AB 4 PL
Gotlands Serviceboende AB 6 PL Yding Holding AB
Gotlands Serviceboende Aktiebolag 1 PL Skåningegård Omsorg AB
Haga Göstorp Psykiatri AB 1 PL Hagagårdens Vårdhem, AB
Hagsunda Aktiebolag 1 PL
Hammarbygruppen Vård Omsorg AB 4 PL
Harvik Vård AB 2 PL Österby Boende Och Omvårdnadsaktiebolag
Hattstugan Vård & Utbildnings Aktiebolag 7 PL
Hjulebo Omsorg AB 1 PL
Hopplunda Aktiebolag 1 PL
Häggenäs Sjukhem Aktiebolag 4 PL
Kavat Vård AB 60 PL Svenska Rehabiliterings Sjukhus AB
Kosmo Hagalidsgården AB 4 PL Norlandia Care As
Kosmo Uppsala B AB 3 PL Kropp Och Själ Med Omtanke i Helsingborg AB
Kosmo Uppsala F AB 3 PL Kropp Och Själ Med Omtanke i Helsingborg AB
Kosmo Uppsala Kj/V AB 6 PL Kropp Och Själ Med Omtanke i Helsingborg AB
Kosmo Uppsala L AB 3 PL Kropp Och Själ Med Omtanke i Helsingborg AB
Lovisagården Vård Aktiebolag 7 PL
Lunnagårds Sjukhem Aktiebolag 4 PL Omsorgsfolket Sverige AB
Långaröds Hemservice Aktiebolag 3 PL





Category Most recent parent
Mimosa Vård & Omsorg AB 1 PL
Norlandia Care AB 108 PL Hospitality Invest As
Norlandia Care Kosmo AB 83 PL Hospitality Invest As
Nytida Ekbacka AB 4 PL
Nömmeberg Vårdhem Aktiebolag 5 PL Sydsvenska Hälsogruppen AB
Omsorgshuset Red Tree Care Center AB 2 PL Omsorgshuset i Stockholm AB
Omvårdnad i Skönvik Aktiebolag 1 PL Förvaltning i Skönvik AB
Parkgården i Kalmar Aktiebolag 2 PL
Personstöd Mälardalen AB 1 PL
Polstjärnan i Sverige AB 1 PL
Private Nursing Sweden AB 3 PL Private Nursing Sweden AB
Redolaris AB 7 PL Consolaris AB
Revalyckans Vård Aktiebolag 2 PL Bäckagårdens Sjukhem Förvaltning AB
Rosenhill Vård & Omsorg AB 4 PL Rfm Skog- & Fastighetsförvaltning AB
Rådomsgården Aktiebolag 7 PL
Sjöberga Gård AB 4 PL
Smedsgård i Alstermo AB 7 PL
Solbacken Vård i Nacka Aktiebolag 1 PL
Solglimman Vård AB 6 PL Värdig Omsorg i Stockholm AB
Solhaga Vårdhem Aktiebolag 7 PL A & O i Sverige AB
Stockholms Äldreboende AB 8 PL Marior AB
Stångberga Omsorg AB 6 PL
Syster Annas Sjukhem Aktiebolag 1 PL Dunkersvik AB
Victum Kompetensutveckling AB 3 PL Victum Kompetensutveckling AB
Victum Omsorg AB 15 PL Victum Kompetensutveckling AB
Vifolkagården i Mjölby AB 1 PL Kropp Och Själ Med Omtanke i Helsingborg AB
Vikingens Vårdhem Aktiebolag 2 PL Asator Vård & Behandling AB
Villa Sjöängen Äldreboende Aktiebolag 1 PL
Vittsjö Sjukhem Aktiebolag 6 PL Sydsvenska Hälsogruppen AB
Vård Med Proffs i Norrort AB 6 PL Vård Med Proffs i Norrort AB
Vårdhemmet Lugnet Aktiebolag 2 PL Sigtuna Vård Och Omsorg AB
Äldreboendet Vigs Ängar AB 3 PL Husberg Arkitektkontor AB
Äldreliv i Stockholm AB 6 PL
Älvstorps Vårdhem Aktiebolag 2 PL Christinelund Konferenscentrum AB
Humana Hemtjänst AB 5 PE Humana Investment Holding AB
Vardaga Medihem AB 10 PE
Backebo Vård & Omsorg AB 7 PL→ PE Team Olivia Group AB
Wikmansgården Aktiebolag 2 PL→ PE Humana AB
Vård i Rosstorp AB 9 NP→ PT
Attendo Individ Och Familj AB 4 PE→ PT Attendo AB (Publ)
Attendo Lss AB 4 PE→ PT Attendo AB (Publ)
Attendo Sverige AB 526 PE→ PT Attendo AB (Publ)
Humana Omsorg AB 68 PE→ PT Humana AB
Partnergruppen Svenska AB 14 PE→ PT Humana AB
Vardaga AB 121 PE→ PT Ambea AB ( Publ )
Vardaga Graniten AB 10 PE→ PT Ambea AB ( Publ )
Vardaga Opalen AB 82 PE→ PT Ambea AB ( Publ )
Vardaga Skåneborg AB 3 PE→ PT Ambea AB ( Publ )
Vardaga Äldreomsorg AB 233 PE→ PT Ambea AB ( Publ )
Attendo Björkhaga Kompetens AB 3 PL→ PE→ PT Attendo AB (Publ)
Norrbärke Sjukhem AB 6 PL→ PE→ PT Humana AB
Vardaga Agaten AB 7 PL→ PE→ PT Ambea AB ( Publ )
Vardaga Gästhemmet Edsby Slott AB 7 PL→ PE→ PT Ambea AB ( Publ )
Vardaga Silverhemmen AB 26 PL→ PE→ PT Ambea AB ( Publ )
Aleris Vårdpilen AB 6 PL→ PT Investor AB
Vardaga Fjällmyran AB 9 PL→ PT
Attendo Hällbogruppen AB 1 PT Attendo AB (Publ)
Vardaga Nytida Omsorg AB 172 PT Investor AB
Note: NP=Non-profit; RFP=Non-Private Equity/Publicly traded for-profit; PE=Private Equity; PTFP=Publicly traded for-profit
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B Non-profit vs. for-profit ownership and service quality: facility-
level fixed effects











(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Non-profit 1.31 -0.15 1.23 -1.20 -2.34
(2.50) (0.33) (3.42) (1.68) (2.73)
N (Observations) 2453 2337 2486 2518 1870
n (Facilities) 513 512 518 518 443
Note: Reference category is for-profit ownership. †p<0.10 *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001. Stan-
dard errors, in parentheses, are clustered at the facility level. All regressions include time-varying
facility-level covariates and year fixed effects.
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C Estimated quality before and after within-facility change in
ownership
The figures below compare the estimated levels in each of the five quality indicators between the year
during which a change in the provider’s ownership, and thereby treatment status, took place and the
year before it. Due to the often very small number of such events, the results of this analysis should
be taken with caution, especially inference derived from the confidence intervals.
In case of missing data on any of the quality indicators for these years, they were imputed with
corresponding values for the closest subsequent/previous year with non-missing data. In some cases


















































































































Figure A1: Change in Ownership Status: Non- and for-profits




















































































































Figure A2: Change in Ownership Status: PL and PE/PT
Note: N = the number of changes in the ownership status with non-missing quality data.
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D IPWRA: Background and Diagnostics
This section presents details and diagnostic tests for the IPWRA regressions, as reported in figure 4.
In summary, the diagnostics indicate that the weighting approach perform relatively well, but also
present a few potential issues to be raised, specifically pertaining to the estimation comparing non-
and for-profits.
As reported in figure 4, the outcome model is identically specified as the main model written in 1,
except in place of the municipal fixed effects, it models geographic- and spatial factors in part con-
tinuously and in part using higher-order dummies by including (log) area of municipality as well as
a set of region dummies (Norrland, Eastern Svealand, Western Svealand, Eastern Götaland, Western
Götaland, Southern Götaland).
First, figure A3 shows consistent, if uneven, overlap between non-profit and for-profit facilities and
between PL and PE/PT-run facilities, throughout the respective distributions. Most notably, the
propensity of for-profits belonging to their actual category is generally high, but non-total. Fur-
ther, given the fact that also non-profit facilities display high or moderate modeled probabilities for
inclusion in this category, the result is a considerable amount of overlap between the two propensity
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Figure A3: Overlap
Second, covariate balance presents some flags for the non-profit vs. for-profit comparisons, while
displaying highly desirable properties for the within for-profit comparison. Beginning with the for-
mer, an overidentification test of this model, displays an acceptable level of imbalance (p=0.372),
although some individual covariates display weighted standardized differences exceeding 0.1. In par-
ticular, General care, which unstandardized differences is negligible, increases to 0.2 (which is the
highest value for any covariate) when standardized.
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Table A3: Covariate balance: non-profit and for-profit providers
balance size
Raw Weighted
Number of obs 2518 2518
Treated obs 355 1250.221
Control obs 2163 1267.779
balance stats
std diff:foreign std diff:alpha ratio: cons ratio:hej
general .0474465 -.2014951 .9446884 1.206352
dementia -.1032695 .0475881 1.119582 .9441702
service .0622123 .1003761 1.289734 1.449328
shortterm -.23723 .0737715 .6748089 1.099217
logspaces -.1264621 .0317249 2.189142 2.332047
logscb pop .6972922 .0039817 1.237609 .930232
scb medinc .3528905 .0189505 1.084366 1.124908
logscb pop x scb medinc .6781671 .0120856 1.23274 1.027755
scb popshare80plus -.3106828 -.1028244 .6357723 .9006489
scb popshare65plus -.4872394 -.0791441 .6569099 .7357371
cc2 -.1725627 -.0073832 .6868285 .9858416
cc3 -.4399698 .0696194 .4046999 1.095315
cc4 .437313 .0050411 3.899824 1.019502
cc5 -.1360492 -.1444496 .6022102 .5606393
cc6 -.2369731 -.1664129 .1869246 .3513712
yr2 -.007842 .0215871 .987116 1.041988
yr3 .0693268 .0288698 1.15031 1.059493
yr4 .0298301 -.0053762 1.06198 .9893711
yr5 -.0099192 -.0860903 .9818944 .8230929
yr6 -.0436548 -.0552896 .9110864 .8828835
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Figure A5: Overlap: privately-run facilities
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For the within for-profit comparison, the unweighted imbalance, which is notably smaller than when
comparing non- with for-profits, diminishes to below 0.1 for all covariates when standardized. Again,
the overidentification test turns out negative, although by a small margin (p=0.106).
Table A4: Covariate balance: within for-profit providers
balance size
Raw Weighted
Number of obs 2163 2163
Treated obs 878 1091.181
Control obs 1285 1071.819
balance stats
std diff:foreign std diff:alpha ratio: cons ratio:hej
general -.0198268 -.0151749 1.024008 1.017607
dementia -.0656031 .0155767 1.081665 .9808196
service -.0071968 -.0157445 .9692998 .9321087
shortterm .0394101 -.0114059 1.052055 .9851176
logspaces -.207153 .0173246 1.203986 1.165568
logscb pop -.1443164 .0144006 1.413952 1.359128
scb medinc -.0780927 .0162403 .9310344 .9651978
logscb pop x scb medinc -.1313561 .0184672 1.20203 1.071176
scb popshare80plus .1496569 -.0211402 1.146879 .8652267
scb popshare65plus .1970857 -.0342608 1.195824 .9233076
cc2 .0471509 -.0098912 1.089669 .981602
cc3 -.0027656 -.0154384 .9969111 .9806752
cc4 -.2903581 .0700219 .1251025 1.366854
cc5 .0271406 -.0021666 1.089403 .9931495
cc6 -.0586011 -.0069064 .774725 .9705112
yr2 .0343306 -.0017038 1.068774 .9966772
yr3 .0092745 .0193662 1.020245 1.040954
yr4 -.0004428 -.0170863 .9994779 .9659077
yr5 -.0509128 -.0179011 .8997995 .963118
yr6 -.0154108 .009872 .9685346 1.020722
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Figure A7: Overlap: for-profit-run facilities
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